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Abstract: The multiple streams framework draws insight from interactions 
between agency and institutions to explore the impact of context, time, and meaning 
on policy change and to assess the institutional and issue complexities permeating the 
European Union (EU) policy process. The authors specify the assumptions and 
structure of the framework and review studies that have adapted it to reflect more 
fully EU decision-making processes. The nature of policy entrepreneurship and policy 
windows are assessed to identify areas of improvement. Finally, the authors sketch 
out a research agenda that refines the logic of political manipulation which permeates 
the lens and the institutional complexity which frames the EU policy process. 




The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) is a lens that was developed to 
explain US policy under conditions of ambiguity. It draws insight from interactions 
between agency and institutions to explain how the policy process works in 
‘organized anarchies’, where there is a shifting roster of participants, opaque 
technologies, and individuals with unclear preferences. Unlike previous reviews 
(Zahariadis 2007), we focus only on European Union (EU) adaptations to highlight 
the institutional and issue complexity of the EU context and the value-added from 
extending policy applications above the national level. What makes MSF particularly 
useful at the EU level is that it takes into account what are normally considered to be 
pathologies of the EU system, such as institutional fluidity, jurisdictional overlap, 
endemic political conflict, policy entrepreneurship, and varying time cycles. We show 
how the lens’s focus on context and agency productively explains the complex 
interactions among EU institutions, issues, and policy entrepreneurs, but we also go 
beyond Zahariadis (2008) to stress the need for further clarification of testable 
hypotheses and the role of policy entrepreneurship. 
The assumptions and structure of the framework are first specified. 
Applications in the EU context are then reviewed, outlining strengths and limitations. 
Finally, we chart a course for future research by pointing attention to valuable insight 
acquired by blending the MSF with neo-institutional approaches of EU policy. 
Assumptions and structure 
In contrast to models of rational behaviour, the MSF accords significance to 
context and time – the latter being a scarce and valuable resource of policy makers, 
whose primary concern is time, rather than task, management. Instead of choosing 
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issues to solve, policy makers are often forced to address a ‘multitude of problems 
that are thrust upon them by factors beyond their control’ (Kingdon 1995: 75). The 
MSF explores which issues get attention and when, how and which actors are 
mobilized to participate in a given choice opportunity, how issues are framed and 
meaning generated, and how the process is politically manipulated by skilled policy 
entrepreneurs. We use EU examples to illustrate the points made. 
The lens makes three assumptions. First, policy makers operate under 
significant and varying time constraints. In practice this means a. they cannot attend 
to all problems, b. they must use heuristics to get things done, and c. they must accept 
outcomes that satisfice rather than optimize. Second, means and ends, solutions and 
problems are generated independently of each other. The implication is that 
information is vague, consequences are uncertain, and ‘there appears to be no 
satisfactory way of determining an appropriate set of means or ends that would obtain 
sufficient agreement among a diverse set of stakeholders’ (Alpaslan and Mitroff 2011: 
23). Political conflict is endemic and issues are frequently settled by activating certain 
frames as EU actors move in and out of the process. Third, ambiguity permeates the 
process. Most actor preferences are opaque and not well defined; organizational 
technology is only partially comprehensible; participation is fluid. Information and 
institutions are not value-neutral. As a result, the process is open to political 
manipulation biased in favour of those who generate information, control access to 
policy venues, and synchronize or exploit group, national, and institutional timetables. 
MSF distinguishes between the world of organized anarchy and that of 
rationality. The MSF does not propose that individuals are acting in a manner 
inconsistent with their judgment of the best outcome. Adopting a system’s point of 
view, it notes the system is not one of full information, clear goals, and exact 
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knowledge of the process. Indeed, policy makers ‘appear to be comfortable with an 
extraordinary array of [conflicting preferences and] unreconciled sources of legitimate 
wants’ (March 1978: 599). In such a world no one controls the linkage between 
individual inputs and policy outputs. Rather ambiguity and randomness are part of 
normal EU policy-making and not pathologies that need to be rectified. 
The lens contains five structural elements: problems, policies, politics (the 
three streams of the MSF), windows of opportunity, and policy entrepreneurs. The 
analytical task is to specify the dynamic and complex interactions that generate 
specific policy outcomes. Problems constitute conditions, measured by indicators 
often thrust into salience by focusing events (Birkland 1997), that policy makers, 
interest groups, and other policy actors believe warrant attention. Rapidly 
deteriorating public finances in Greece, bank implosions in Ireland and political 
conflict in Georgia are all problems that may warrant policy maker attention. Policies 
are ideas or solutions that specialists develop to address pressing problems. Domestic 
fiscal reforms combined with external assistance to allow Greece to continue 
financing its sovereign debt and mediation in the Georgia conflict are solutions to 
problems of the day. Politics constitutes the broader environment within which policy 
is made. The ideological proclivity of incoming governments in EU capitals, the 
political muscle of bank lobbies in Brussels, and the partisan balance of power in the 
European Parliament constitute elements of the political stream. 
Policy windows open in the politics or problem streams and describe the 
particular context within which issues are debated and policies made. They constitute 
triggers that delimit and/or help frame the way issues are debated. For example, the 
Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 ushered in new policies and a 
different attitude toward terrorism. Policy entrepreneurs are skilled and resourceful 
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actors who couple the three streams together – problems, policies, and politics – 
during open policy windows. Entrepreneurs are an important part of the process 
because policy is often not made in a rational, linear manner. In the presence of 
ambiguity of information and issue complexity, entrepreneurs craft contestable 
meaning, which they in turn disseminate to policy makers in order to activate 
attention and mobilize support or opposition. 
For example, the decision to bail out Greece involves far more than a cost-
benefit analysis of Greek public finances. It is fundamentally a question of credibility, 
confidence, trust, and faith – EU credibility in the eyes of investors and taxpayers, 
confidence in Greek ability to implement painful reforms, voter trust in German 
leadership, and faith in the euro. Moreover, to gain political traction a successful 
bailout depends vitally on framing reforms as promoting growth rather than imposing 
austerity. Entrepreneurs may be Commission officials by virtue of privileged position 
in EU information networks, prominent national policy makers, high-level members 
of other EU institutions, or well-connected non-governmental organization (NGO) 
actors with a stake in EU policy. 
Coupling is a major aspect of the MSF. Apart from skills and resources, 
entrepreneurs pursue strategies to join together problems and policies into attractive 
packages, which are then ‘sold’ to receptive policy makers. The panoply of strategies 
includes appeals to higher-order national or EU symbols, framing as loss or gain, 
affect priming through mass arousal of public sentiment, and salami tactics. For 
example, as long as the problem remained framed as sinking Greek finances, EU 
policy makers were collectively reluctant to assist Greece pay back its debt to private 
(ironically mostly EU) creditors. It was only after the risk of contagion threatened to 
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engulf their own economies that aid ‘to save the euro’ became possible (Zahariadis 
2012). 
Taking the lens beyond the national level clearly demonstrates the need to 
specify how time cycles (Goetz 2009) also affect coupling. The short-term feedback 
from financial markets stands in stark contrast to long-term political calculations by 
national policy makers. To take another example, the beginning of EU budget 
negotiations opens policy windows for a wide range of issues to be addressed. Paying 
attention to these negotiations depends partly on national electoral timetables, making 
coordination a crucial component of coupling. Policy entrepreneurs must straddle not 
only national but also EU institutional venues in ways that maintain domestic political 
support and still cultivate robustness of appeal to diverse audiences. The complexity 
of EU institutions serves as a valuable laboratory in which to test the conditions under 
which strategies of political manipulation work. The next section critically reviews 
those efforts. 
A review of applications in the EU context 
This section considers the uses to which the MSF has been put in academic 
writings. There is an extensive body of work which references Kingdon, frequently in 
the context of identifying individual elements of the MSF relevant as background to 
those papers (examples include the concept of the policy entrepreneur, windows of 
opportunity for policy-making, sometimes concepts as broad as agenda-setting), but 
without applying the ideas directly. A rather smaller number of articles draw on 
individual elements of the MSF in their own analyses. Fewer still apply what one 
might call the ‘full’ MSF to EU policy analysis. 
6 
In this section, we begin with a very brief overview of the origins of the MSF. 
After this, a small sample of papers is presented to illustrate how elements of the MSF 
have been utilised, but without the full model being called upon. This is followed by a 
fuller consideration of the key articles which have applied the MSF to EU issues. As 
we shall see, the first set of partial applications, which focus principally on agenda-
setting, tend to come before the publication of Zahariadis (2003). The work of 
Zahariadis (notably 2003; 2008) marks a shift in the literature. By presenting 
arguments for two notable developments in the MSF, to analyse decision-making as 
well as agenda-setting; and to adapt the MSF to accommodate EU decision-making 
specificities, the foundation was laid for much of the empirical work which followed, 
and which is explored below. 
The starting point for the MSF, however, is Cohen et al (1972). This analysis 
of “organized anarchies” (universities, specifically) looked at organizational choice in 
the presence of problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation. 
They argue (on page 2) that ‘one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into 
which various kinds of problems and policies are dumped by participants as they are 
generated.’ They go on to say (on pages 2-3) that ‘a decision is an outcome or 
interpretation of several relatively independent streams within an organization.’ They 
identify four streams: problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. ‘The 
garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions, and participants move from 
one choice opportunity to another’ (page 16). Kingdon (1995: 86) follows the 
“general logic” of Cohen et al, but from his research into United States’ (US) federal 
health and transportation policies, identifies three streams – problems, policies and 
politics. 
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In 2001, Johan Olsen identified the EUS as ‘an obvious candidate’ for study 
using a garbage can approach (Olsen 2001: 196). He also stated that ‘it may also be 
necessary to accept that significant political phenomena sometimes are complex 
enough to make any simpler theory of them unsatisfactory’ (ibid), which could be 
taken as a clarion call to which this collection, offering multiple approaches, is a 
response (see also Winn, 1998). 
Turning to some of the literature referencing the work of Kingdon, we begin 
with a sample of papers which highlight some of the constituent concepts used by 
academics, without their utilising the full MSF. The implication of this is that these 
are concepts, embodied in the MSF, which are seen more widely as having particular 
relevance and importance in policy analysis. Examples include the (implicit) 
referencing of windows of opportunity and (policy) entrepreneurial activity (Cram 
2001; see inter alia, page 777). Policy entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship are also 
hinted at by Ringe (2005), in his analysis of the functioning of the European 
Parliament. His work also emphasises both ambiguity and institutions (see also 
Corbett, 2005: 153). Princen (2007), meanwhile, references Kingdon in the context of 
agenda-setting. 
Early papers which utilise the MSF more fully in their analyses include, 
notably, Pollack 1997; Nugent and Saurugger 2002; Krause 2003; and Jordan et al 
2003. Krause 2003, and later, Corbett, consider ambiguity as being a result of the 
institutional nature of the EU. Within that institutional structure, the Commission is 
often seen in these earlier contributions as a policy entrepreneur but, consistent with 
an agenda-setting view of the MSF, is not a part of the decision-making process. Nor 
is the Commission able to open a window of opportunity, but must wait for one to 
open. 
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One particular dimension of institutional structure in the EU which creates 
ambiguity is its multi-level nature (see also the contribution by Stephenson 2013 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). 
Specifically, the Commission’s role as policy entrepreneur ‘seems to depend largely 
on member state uncertainty regarding the problems and policies confronting them 
and on the Commission’s acuity in identifying problems and policies that can rally the 
necessary consensus among member states in search of solutions to their policy 
problems’ (Pollack 1997: 128; see also Jordan et al 2003). The role of the 
Commission as policy entrepreneur within the Politics Stream is an important part of 
the work of Nowak (2010). He compares two legal cases, Dassonville and Cassis de 
Dijon, through Kingdon’s multiple streams lens. He identifies why, whilst these cases 
raised essentially the same legal issue in European Court of Justice rulings, the latter 
case resulted in the development of the policy concept of mutual recognition in intra-
EU trade, a central concept in developing the Single European Market. Importantly, 
he distinguishes clearly what was lacking in the first case to prevent this policy 
development at that time. 
The character of the window of opportunity also receives brief treatment. It 
has been argued that the opening of a window of opportunity, ‘is not so much an 
active agent [of change] itself but rather a facilitator for the independent variables’ 
(Nugent and Saurugger 2002: 349). These authors, drawing on Keeler (1993), also 
suggest that the wider the open window, the greater the possible change – with 
unpredictable events opening the window wider (an idea returned to below). 
Turning to the more recent literature, Eberlein and Radaelli (2010), and Borrás 
and Radaelli (2011), along with Corbett (2005), are of particular interest as they not 
only use the MSF, but do so in conjunction with other analytical frameworks. Borrás 
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and Radaelli embed (historical and discursive) institutionalism within the MSF 
(something Ackrill and Kay (2011) also do, albeit implicitly). Corbett explicitly draws 
on the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) to illuminate issue-definition and venue; 
and March (1994) to further the analysis of decision processes. 
The aforementioned papers, however, typically adopt the MSF without 
adaptation to the specifics of EU policy processes. The nature and sources of 
ambiguity need to be defined clearly, partly as a result of which policy spillovers may 
not be of the type described by Kingdon, for whom a demonstration effect saw policy 
ideas copied in different policy arenas. Such institutional ambiguity may result in 
direct spillovers between linked policy arenas. Do these spillovers, in turn, affect the 
nature of the opening of a window? 
The role of specific policy entrepreneurs needs careful delineation from the 
broader process of policy entrepreneurship (see, inter alia, Mintrom and Norman 
2009; Ackrill and Kay 2011). Further, given the frequent identification in the extant 
literature of ‘the Commission’ (usually as a singular entity) as a policy entrepreneur, 
this challenges the idea of entrepreneurs being located outside of decision-making 
processes (although such an idea is consistent if the MSF is viewed solely as a means 
of analysing agenda-setting, but not decision-making). 
Two papers which have gone furthest in trying to address these issues, are 
Natali (2004) and Ackrill and Kay (2011). Natali (2004: 1080) argues that policy 
entrepreneurs have the ability to help open windows, an idea that Corbett (2005) and, 
later, Ackrill and Kay, develop. This is important given the position of the 
Commission within EU structures. The policy entrepreneur can, as Ackrill and Kay 
show, be an individual within the Commission. On the other hand, the sole right of the 
Commission to propose legislation puts the organisation as a whole in a unique 
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position regarding agenda-setting (although Peterson (1999) reports estimates that 
indicate, at that time, only between 10 and 25 percent of all EU legislative proposals 
began life in the Commission). 
Furthermore, as also explored by Ackrill and Kay, the Commission is not a 
black box, but an organisation divided along thematic lines, across which many policy 
issues span. This can itself be a source of ambiguity. These authors thus build on the 
earlier work of Nugent and Saurugger (2002: 351), who spoke of institutional 
ambiguity creating ‘boundary problems’, where policy issues overlap different policy 
arenas. 
As for the nature of windows of opportunity, Nugent and Saurugger (2002) 
introduced the notion of windows being open a bit or a lot – which, in turn, influences 
the magnitude of the policy changes that are then possible. Natali (2004: 1079) also 
raises the width of the window as an issue. That said, his prime focus is on seeking to 
understand when a window will open. Specifically, ‘variables do not float in the 
policy-making process, but combine with each other in a chain of events. A policy 
window is the result of an iterative process between problems, solutions, actors and 
events’ Natali (2004: 1080). Ackrill and Kay (2011) took this idea in another direction, 
considering the length of time for which the window is open. Specifically, they 
consider situations where the window can be held open for a sustained period of time, 
thereby increasing the opportunities for decision-making to occur. 
Such adaptations are not merely cosmetic, but have important implications for 
the MSF and its applicability to the study of EU policy processes. There is little 
disputing the fact that the EU, as an institutional structure, is highly complex and 
ambiguous (although in their analysis of the Lisbon Strategy, Borrás and Radaelli 
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argue that, in policy areas relevant to the Strategy, the 2005 revision did go some way 
to clarifying the roles of Council and Commission). 
A recent addition to the literature (Bache, forthcoming), utilises the MSF to 
look at an issue which, despite being very much part of policy discourse in recent 
years, has yet to receive policy attention. He analyses quality-of-life indicators as an 
input into public policy. Bache concludes that despite this idea receiving attention, it 
cannot yet be described as an idea whose time has come. Importantly, Bache 
identifies reasons why such measures have yet to yield policy responses. This is an 
important methodological contribution precisely because it improves our 
understanding of how the MSF can be applied to situations where there have not been 
policy responses to issues that, broadly speaking, have been identified as policy 
problems. Given the extent to which this issue has been attended to by politicians, it 
appears that a window of opportunity exists but which, for various technical and 
political reasons, has not resulted in a policy decision. 
Strengths and limitations 
Strengths 
While the MSF is valuable as a lens in organizing descriptions of EU policy-
making processes, often unacknowledged is its contribution to meeting the challenge 
that confronts all temporally-orientated policy studies: how to abstract from particular 
historical contexts and identify the extent to which regularities across historical time 
and space endure. A motivating force behind the MSF is the search for causal 
regularities in the policy process whilst, at the same time, allowing for the explanatory 
influence of contingency. 
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Although unexplored as yet in the EU policy process literature, there is 
potential for the MSF to be part of a fruitful dialogue with broader neo-institutionalist 
analysis in the study of EU policy-making. Notably, the MSF shares with 
institutionalism, especially the historical varieties, a stress on change being contingent 
on particular moments where the regular reproduction of patterns within 
institutionally complex environments is disrupted and reform moments present 
themselves. For example, the widely-held view that institutions are always vulnerable 
and there is nothing automatic about stability, recently outlined and extended in 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010), chimes with the insights of the MSF into the critical 
moments which contain reform potential. 
In recent accounts of institutional change, active coalitions are required to 
underpin institutional stability. There are moments when institutions are vulnerable to 
adaptation, conversion and exhaustion. Change comes from shifts in coalitions 
resulting from the interaction between institutions in complex environments and 
changes in the level and extent of institutional compliance. These change mechanisms 
have a family resemblance – albeit distant - to disturbances in the problem or policy 
streams that provide part of the causal driving force in explanations within the MSF. 
Furthermore, the proposition that institutions are always incomplete, often 
overlapping and ambiguous is commonplace in several ‘new’ institutionalisms (see 
Doleys 2013 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD/UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>). This requires a more refined attention to historical causality that goes 
beyond the excessively deterministic work in which actors appear to be institutional 
‘dopes’ responding blindly to the requirements of the institution. 
The MSF holds the possibility for the theoretical accommodation and perhaps 
extension of these approaches by providing elements to apprehend shifts in actor 
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preferences from outside the institutionalised policy environment, as well as changes 
in actor strategies which can result in change at critical moments. The account of 
agency in the MSF is potentially rich; actors are rational but operate in particular 
contexts, and their rationality must be understood in such situational terms. Actors are 
self-determining and motivations may range from external regulation through to 
intrinsic regulation, which express themselves in creative policy-making strategies. 
In Barzelay and Gallego (2006), the MSF is interpreted as allowing the 
analytical separation of the broader context from the analysis of particular situations. 
The MSF requires scholars to be simultaneously sensitive to how spillovers and 
focussing events may lead to fleeting moments in on-going policy histories where 
reform potential exists, as well as understand the interaction between agents in such 
contexts at particular times. In such terms, the MSF is a mixture of the systemic and 
the situational and this is a major strength and novelty in the study of the EU policy 
process. Kingdon began the task of providing a set of causal mechanisms by which to 
explain contextual change in the US as well as providing insights into whether policy 
change opportunities are actually exploited and a policy proposal enjoys a strong 
probability of being agreed and implemented. The challenge for EU policy scholars is 
to translate and adapt the MSF as appropriate to analysing the EU context. 
As discussed, the coupling of separate sub-policy processes, and the role of the 
policy entrepreneurs therein, is the important causal driver in the MSF. The 
coincidence of three streams at certain moments greatly increases the likelihood that a 
policy reform is enacted. The framework places the policy entrepreneur in a context 
but, in stressing ideational effort and conscious political activity, it reveals that the 
context is not wholly exogenous to the model. The MSF specifies agency a function 
of institutionalised roles, but that specification is not so determined as to preclude 
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creativity, and actors’ strategies that are unexpected and influential in upsetting 
institutional scripts. Put another way, the openness and fluidity in the policy process is 
balanced by the recognition that explanations of sequences of policymaking can only 
be satisfying if they examine how the specific policy-making situation is bounded by 
a historically contingent context, including both formal and informal institutions. 
Limitations 
The limits of the MSF are in many respects consequent to its analytical 
novelty. It places the link between situations and broader context at the centre of 
understanding the EU policy process; yet the MSF remains limited in its ability so far 
to fully specify that link. The research agenda endures: how to understand policy 
entrepreneurs’ situations in the broader context. Currently, much focus is on 
entrepreneurs as individuals with particular life experiences, aptitudes and policy 
preferences (see for example Corbett 2005). Such an analytical approach seemingly 
downplays the real ambition which girds the MSF: to illuminate the ceteris paribus 
clause for the comparative analysis of policy processes (Ackrill and Kay 2011). No 
entrepreneur alone will ever be enough to cause policy reform; we always require an 
account of the context. A ceteris paribus clause plays the role of fixing analytically 
the ‘moment’ replete with reform possibility. This facilitates claims such as ‘this 
policy entrepreneurial strategy in this situation is successful only in this particular 
context’. If context changes in another case or over time - i.e. everything is not equal -
then we cannot infer the same entrepreneurial causal mechanism will lead to reform. 
The expert and skilled advocacy of a policy idea, or skilled brokering, in one context 
does not produce reform; but exactly the same idea and brokering in a different 
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context does produces reform. This is the causal structure behind the maxim that 
‘ideas have their time.’ 
There is an additional ideational mechanism connecting the three streams that 
is hinted at but not really developed in the MSF literature. The emergence of ideas 
within the policy stream may be considered analogous to natural selection: policy 
ideas circulate, combine and recombine in the garbage can but are selected by an 
environment of technical feasibility, value congruence, budgetary implications, and 
political support. In this case, conditions of issue complexity can select certain 
proposals from within the policy stream; and policy change occurs in response to the 
nature of the policy window, as opposed to the advocacy or brokering entrepreneurial 
mechanisms where the policy window simply provides an opportunity for coupling. In 
this mechanism, the policy issue which is salient in the window may be of such 
complexity as to demand a unique solution or, at least, the number of policy solutions 
are so highly circumscribed that it is the nature of the window that does much of the 
explanatory heavy lifting, as opposed to entrepreneurial agency. 
This variation in policy windows is an important challenge for future research 
using the MSF in the EU context. In particular, for the concept of windows of 
opportunity to provide analytical leverage within the MSF framework it must escape 
the circular logic that all episodes of reform are windows of opportunity, and that 
what characterises a window of opportunity is evidence of policy change. The 
challenge for scholars is to distinguish, theoretically and empirically, non-change 
windows from those that result in change windows. Theoretical work on windows of 
opportunity where change or reforms do not eventuate is limited; as is sustained 
empirical analysis which recreates through counterfactual reasoning moments where 
reform possibility appears to exist but where no reforms are observed. Without a 
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convincing account of failed opportunities, the MSF will be limited in both the range 
of policy processes it can account for as well as the explanatory power it can offer in 
the causal reconstruction of policy-making episodes. 
As noted, coupling is the critical element in the MSF and is a function of both 
the nature of the policy window and the skills and resources of the policy entrepreneur. 
However, almost all the literature focuses on the latter element rather than the first. In 
the original Kingdon model, the streams are independent and thus the opening of a 
window in either the politics or problem streams is not causally related to the policy 
stream. Instead, the policy stream is a transmission belt of previous policy decisions, 
policy analyses and the nature of the policy discourse. Within the stream there are 
networks of policy entrepreneurs who mediate the emergence of policy ideas and 
attempt to increase the receptivity of policy-makers to their ideas. 
Importantly, what emerges as a potential solution in response to the opening of 
a policy window is the result of prior advocacy for ideas and proposals by 
entrepreneurs, in particular their skill, persistence and resources in pushing particular 
project. For MSF applications to the EU, it is their ability to sell these ideas to policy 
makers in response to policy windows – and thereby couple the politics, problems and 
policy streams – that explains whether windows of policy opportunity actually result 
in policy change. 
However, this account of coupling fails to capture the intuition in broader 
policy scholarship of a mood of ‘something needing to be done’. In a manner 
consistent with MSF insights into situations where policy solutions exist in search of a 
problem or rationale, there is the logical possibility that agendas may be used by 
policy makers to search out proposals. When these windows occur in the political 
stream, the agenda may be short term or symbolic, forcing a search for politically 
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successful policies. These are not obviously related to solving policy problems and 
the MSF contains no presumption of rationality in the policy process. Policy may be 
decided by the coupling of the politics and policy streams, which subsequently drives 
a search for elements in the problem stream that might serve to legitimise the already-
decided policy. 
In the case of windows creating short term, time-pressured political agendas 
which act as filter mechanisms for ideas in the policy stream, the role for policy 
entrepreneurs becomes limited. They still advocate and keep ideas available for 
selection by policy-makers driven by short term political pressures, but their 
brokerage role is bounded in explaining when, why and in what form policy change is 
enacted. Instead, it is the nature of the policy window and the reform agenda it creates 
for policy-makers which plays the primary causal role in shaping which policy ideas 
gain attention. 
This however leads back us back to the limits of the MSF. For example, 
Corbett (2005) locates policy entrepreneurs in the higher levels of the Commission. 
This is perfectly reasonable for the study of EU policy processes, but in doing so the 
distinction between policy entrepreneurs and policy makers in the politics stream 
becomes blurred. Furthermore, for Corbett it is essential to appreciate that these are 
individuals with life histories, personal beliefs, identities as well as an institutional 
position. Thus you must understand them, beyond just their institutional context to 
apprehend fully their influence in policy change. 
This is indubitably true, but it leaves us with a research agenda about policy 
entrepreneurship: why do some succeed and others fail in different contexts? Why are 
some able to discern and exploit opportunities and others not? To the extent that the 
effectiveness of policy entrepreneurs is a function of institutional position, what does 
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the concept add? Does the term mean anything without analysis of the particular 
situation in which opportunities occur (i.e., entrepreneurship qua actions can only be 
judged in a particular situation)? 
There is a further alternative mechanism that focuses on a policy window in 
either the politics or problem stream forcing or enabling policy-makers to search for 
solutions. Instead of passive agents who are sold coupling strategies by policy 
entrepreneurs, or bound by issue complexity to a highly circumscribed set of policy 
options, they employ intentional selection mechanisms to select a policy solution that 
is appropriate for the nature of the agenda set by the policy window. Thus policy 
solutions can make it onto the decision-agenda not because they are sold by the 
persistence and skill of policy entrepreneurs but rather because policy makers select 
the ideas (as appropriate for the policy window) and thus the policy entrepreneurs 
who advocate. This alternative specification further limits in the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship: most pertinently, are those whom we have hitherto called policy-
makers actually policy entrepreneurs? 
In the MSF literature, the answer is ambiguous. For some, policy 
entrepreneurs sit outside the formal decision-making process. However, as noted 
above subsequent scholarship (particularly in applications to the EU) has also placed 
policy entrepreneurs in senior bureaucratic positions. If policy entrepreneurs can be in 
high formal office as well as outside the formal machinery of policy making, then the 
policy entrepreneurship concept is stretched. Doing so conflates two separate 
mechanisms in policy making: the selling of ideas to policy makers and the selecting 
of ideas by policy makers. Both may be entrepreneurial. One suggestion is to 
understand entrepreneurship as a general label for a set of behaviours in the policy 
process, rather than a permanent characteristic of an individual or a particular role. On 
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this argument, entrepreneurs can be from anywhere and the challenge is to distinguish 
those policy-makers who play their institutional role from those who qualify as 
entrepreneurs in particular reform episodes. The attribution of causality to agency qua 
policy entrepreneurship is only ever temporary and acutely sensitive to the particular 
context and situation. 
The discussion of entrepreneurship in EU policy-making tends to rely on the 
unstated argument that entrepreneurial characteristics at the individual level are not 
normally distributed in the population; there is something distinctive about the 
individuals who are policy entrepreneurs. However, this attribution is always done ex 
post and always to political actors involved in actual reform. Our understanding of 
policy entrepreneurship thus becomes significantly limited. For instance, we have no 
analytical means of explaining successful entrepreneurship because we have no 
sample of failed entrepreneurial strategies. Perhaps more importantly, we equate 
successful entrepreneurship with actual reform, but what about agency in defence of 
the status quo? There are various strategies employed by actors to preserve 
institutions and policy systems against reform strategies. Therefore, we can only 
really explain entrepreneurship in terms of actions in a particular context. This is 
perhaps better expressed as policy entrepreneurship not being a stable characteristic 
that differentiates policy agents in all situations; but rather as referring to actions in 
certain policy-making situations. 
The implication of placing EU issue and institutional complexity at the heart 
of the development of frameworks for the analysis of the EU policy process is that 
any framework or lens, individually, will be incomplete. The acknowledgement of 
complexity as the central feature of life in the EU undermines any search for a general 
theory of EU policy-making. Pluralism rather than monism underpins the intellectual 
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project of this collection. The MSF contributes much to this endeavor in its ability to 
complement other approaches, most particularly those which provide accounts of the 
causal logic of institutional variables. The MSF analysis privileges links between the 
broader contextual regularities and patterns, and situational moments of contingency 
where policy-making processes may end up heading in unexpected and unpredictable 
directions. The three streams, their coupling, and the role of agency therein provide 
analytical leverage on periods of relative policy stability as well as specific moments 
where things are open to change. 
As it stands, the MSF is not formally articulated as a theory or model that 
might allow empirical testing of its predictive accuracy. Indeed, it is moot whether 
this is a desirable ambition for a framework whose strongest empirical achievements 
to date have been to offer temporally-orientated perspectives on EU policy. It may be 
more productive to develop the MSF in conjunction with other EU policy process 
approaches explored here, rather than as a competitor. This kind of pluralism suggests 
that although different lenses might be rivalrous in the analysis of any particular 
reform episode, under similar conditions they may be additive rather in terms of 
overall explanatory power available for apprehending highly specific combinations of 
causal mechanisms across time and different EU policy sectors. Pragmatist 
philosopher C. S. Pierce argues that different frameworks should be viewed as strands 
braided together into a rope, instead of links in a chain. With links in a chain, if there 
is even one weak link it does not matter whether different approaches are competitive 
or complementary in any particular instance. However, while individual strands in a 
rope may not be strong enough to support the explanatory weight for which they are 
needed, they may be stronger when braided together. 
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Where do we go from here? 
The MSF has proven useful in identifying and helping to resolve puzzles of 
EU policy processes and policy-making. Its usefulness lies in the lens’ capacity to 
handle ambiguity and its ability to capture the complex interactions among 
institutions, issues, and entrepreneurs. This has particular resonance in the EU case, 
with its unique and highly complex multi-level decision-making process. However, as 
we argued above, the MSF’s novelty is also its limitation. The focus on context and 
agency is an important but analytically difficult enterprise because it demands access 
to significant amounts of information to explain without the promise of corresponding 
ability to predict. To be sure, MSF incorporates randomness into the explanation so it 
cannot predict which individual events or outcomes will occur. But it can generate 
expectations that increase the likelihood of some outcomes occurring and not others. 
Clarifying causal drivers and specifying testable hypotheses will go a long way 
toward augmenting explanatory power and enhancing our understanding of 
probabilistic expectations. 
Research clarifying the lens’ internal causal drivers and hypotheses, 
undertaken in recent papers through reflection on the MSF in the EU context, offers 
considerable promise for future research. Recent work has begun to enhance our 
understanding of both agenda-setting and decision-making; of the distinction between 
policy entrepreneurs as individuals and policy entrepreneurship as a process; of 
‘boundary problems’ – policy spillovers potentially being endogenous as well as 
exogenous – and of the implications of that distinction for policy-making; and of 
policy entrepreneurs participating in decision-making and opening policy windows. 
These developments are important because they give the MSF greater nuance and 
sophistication. 
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We do not argue that a singular, universal, multiple streams lens can be 
developed for use in all EU circumstances; adaptation of the lens may be required. 
But this is an essential feature of the MSF and why it is so well-suited to applications 
where agenda-setting and decision-making are replete with ambiguities. Clarification 
of the lens’ internal causal drivers and their adaptation to the EU context hold 
considerable promise for future research. For example, the EU’s institutional context 
and varying timescapes are uniquely suited to further specification of coupling as an 
institutional venue-shopping strategy. Under what conditions do hierarchical vs non-
hierarchical institutional arrangements promote venue-shopping and success? How do 
policy windows influence the ‘shopping’ process? Links with the literature on 
punctuated equilibria (Princen 2013 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO 
ADD/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) and multi-level governance (Stephenson 
2013 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) may 
provide fruitful collaborative research in these areas. Given the proclivity of EU 
mechanisms for cooperation and for limiting conflict, how do frame contests work 
across issues? Daviter (2011) provides some examples from the biotechnology field, 
but more work needs to be done to capture fully the conditions of entrepreneurial 
success and its interaction with broader political forces, including the presence or 
absence of a ‘European’ mood, which is a concept that features prominently in 
national applications of the MSF (e.g., Kingdon 1995). 
Another feature of the MSF lens which makes it suitable to application to the 
EU context is its fluidity. The three streams not only ebb and flow in relation to each 
other but, in so doing, transverse and connect different levels of policy actors. EU 
policy-making processes are relatively stable, but actor participation in policy-making 
is fluid and the policy issues considered at the EU level is growing. The deliberately 
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loose coupling between means and ends, choice and implementation, what Héritier 
(1999) calls the strategy of subterfuge, has served member states well so far. However, 
an expansion of EU policy competences increasingly implies s member states are 
giving up sole jurisdiction over a range of policy issues. At the same time, there 
continue to be debates over the extent to which the EU suffers from a democratic 
deficit (e.g., Moravcsik 2002; Crombez 2003). 
The MSF predicts political conflict will rise, increasing the importance of 
policy entrepreneurs and their strategies. At the same time, democratic accountability 
through representation remains unchanged even if some cosmetic changes are made, 
such as the proposal to elect the President of the Commission through popular 
elections. A major task for the MSF is to specify channels of democratic 
accountability in light of increasing complexity and political acrimony. Does greater 
EU institutional complexity actually increase democratic accountability and 
transparency or does the presence of more institutional venues give rise to more 
opportunities for political manipulation and lower transparency? 
Institutional and issue complexity amplify dramatically through jurisdictional 
overlap, while accountability is diffused among multiple institutions and actors. One 
may view such developments as increasing the potential number of policy windows 
available for entrepreneurs to push through pet proposals that apply throughout the 
EU, but for which groups of voters have little input. Assuming the distribution of 
timescapes does not change dramatically, the likelihood of such opportunities will 
multiply, intensifying political manipulation struggles. As Krause (2003) implies in 
his study of the CFSP, there are, quite simply, an expanding number of areas of EU 
activity to which the MSF can be applied. Any takers? 
24 
Biographical Notes: Robert Ackrill is Professor of European Economics and Policy 
at Nottingham Business School, UK. Adrian Kay is an Associate Professor in the 
Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University. 
Addresses for correspondence: Professor Robert Ackrill, Division of Economics, 
Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, Burton Street, 
Nottingham, NG1 4BU, UK. email: robert.ackrill@ntu.ac.uk. Dr Adrian Kay, 
Associate Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy, Crawford Building, No. 132 
Lennox Crossing, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. 
email: adrian.kay@anu.edu.au. 
References 
Ackrill, R. and Kay, A. (2011) ‘Multiple streams in EU policy-making: the case of the 
2005 sugar reform’, Journal of European Public Policy 18(1): 72-89. 
Alpaslan, C.M. and Mitroff, I.I. (2011) Swans, swine, and swindlers, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Bache, I. (forthcoming) ‘Measuring quality of life for public policy: an idea whose 
time has come? Agenda-setting dynamics in the European Union’, Journal of 
European Public Policy. 
Barzelay, M. and Gallego, R. (2006) ‘From “new institutionalism” to “institutional 
processualism”: advancing knowledge about public management policy change’, 
Governance 19(4): 531-57. 
Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B. (1993) Agendas and instability in American politics, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
25 
Birkland, T.A. (1997) After disaster: agenda-setting, public policy and focusing 
events, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Borrás, S. and Radaelli, C.M. (2011) ‘The politics of governance architecture: 
creation, change and effects of the EU Lisbon Strategy’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 18(4): 463-84. 
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1972) ‘A garbage can model of 
organizational choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 1-25. 
Corbett, A. (2005) Universities and the Europe of knowledge: ideas, institutions and 
policy entrepreneurship in European Union higher education policy, 1955-2005, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cram, L. (2001) ‘Whither the Commission? reform, renewal and the issue-attention 
cycle’, Journal of European Public Policy 8(5): 770-86. 
Crombez, C. (2003) ‘The democratic deficit in the European Union: much ado about 
nothing’? European Union Politics 4(1): 101-20. 
Daviter, F. (2011) Policy-framing in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Doleys, T. (2013) <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD/UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF> 
Eberlein, B. and Radaelli, C.M. (2010) ‘Mechanisms of conflict management in EU 
regulatory policy’, Public Administration 88(3): 782-99. 
Goetz, K.H. (2009) ‘How does the EU tick? five propositions on political time’, 
Journal of European Public Policy 16(2): 202-20. 
Héritier, A. (1999) Policy-making and diversity in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
26 
Jordan, A., Wurzel, R., Zito, A.R. and Brückner, L. (2003) ‘European governance and 
the transfer of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) in the European 
Union’, Public Administration 81(3): 555-74. 
Keeler, J. (1993) ‘Opening the window for reform’, Comparative Political Studies 
25(4): 433–86. 
Krause, A. (2003) ‘The European Union’s Africa policy: the Commission as policy 
entrepreneur in the CFSP’, European Foreign Affairs Review 8: 221-37. 
Kingdon, J. (1995) Agendas, alternatives and public policies, 2nd ed, New York: 
Harper Collins. 
Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (eds) (2010) Explaining institutional change: ambiguity, 
agency, and power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
March, J. (1978) ‘Bounded rationality, ambiguity and the engineering of choice’, Bell 
Journal of Economics 9: 587-608. 
March, J. (1994) A Primer on decision-making, New York: Free Press. 
Mintrom, M. and Norman, P. (2009) ‘Policy entrepreneurship and policy change’, 
Policy Studies Journal 37(4): 649-67. 
Moravcsik, A. (2002) ‘In defence of the ‘democratic deficit’: reassessing legitimacy 
in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 603-24. 
Natali, D. (2004) ‘Europeanization, policy arenas, and creative opportunism: the 
politics of welfare state reforms in Italy’, Journal of European Public Policy 11(6): 
1077-95. 
Nowak, T. (2010) ‘Of garbage cans and rulings: judgements of the European Court of 
Justice in the EU Legislative Process’, West European Politics 33(4): 753-69. 
27 
Nugent, N. and Saurugger, S. (2002) ‘Organizational structuring: the case of the 
European Commission and its external policy responsibilities’, Journal of 
European Public Policy 9(3): 345-64. 
Olsen, J.P. (2001) ‘Garbage cans, new institutionalism, and the study of politics’, 
American Political Science Review 95(1): 191-98. 
Peterson, J. (1999) ‘The Santer Era: the European Commission in normative, 
historical and theoretical perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 6(1): 46-
65. 
Pollack, M.A. (1997) ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European 
Community’, International Organization 51(1): 99-134. 
Princen, S. (2007) ‘Agenda-setting in the European Union: a theoretical exploration 
and agenda for research’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(1): 21-38. 
Princen, S. (2013) <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD/UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF> 
Ringe, N. (2005) ‘Policy preference formation in legislative politics: structures, actors, 
and focal points’, American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 731-45. 
Stephenson, P. (2013) <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD/UPDATE DETAILS 
AT PROOF> 
Winn, N. (1998) ‘Who gets what, when, and how? The contest conceptual and 
disciplinary nature of governance and policy-making in the European Union’, 
Politics 18(2): 119-32. 
Zahariadis, N. (2003) Ambiguity and choice in public policy: political manipulation in 
democratic societies, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
28 
Zahariadis, N. (2007) ‘The multiple streams framework: structure, limitations, 
prospects’, in P.A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edn, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, pp. 65–92. 
Zahariadis, N. (2008) ‘Ambiguity and choice in European public policy’, Journal of 
European Public Policy 15(4): 514-30. 
Zahariadis, N. (2012) ‘Complexity, coupling, and policy effectiveness: the European 
response to the Greek sovereign debt crisis’, Journal of Public Policy 32(2): 99-
116. 
Wordcount, all-in, is 
29 
